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INFORMATION ECONOMY

Phillip J. Bryson*

The New Economy Is Dead,
Long Live the Information Economy
The arrival of the 2001-2003 recession caused many to suppose that the so-called “New
Economy” was now defunct. This article addresses a number of related issues, including
the question of the durability and viability of business cycles in the face of the technological developments of the information age. It asks what went wrong with the New Economy
and examines its characteristics as well as its remaining possibilities and prospects for the
future. Finally, it considers the spread of the Information Economy to Europe, especially to
Germany, the country that one might expect to be the leading European player, but which
is not at present actually a strong competitor for that role.

D

rubrics. “The New Economy,” which in any case is no
longer so new, should now give way to rubrics like “the
information economy.”

The New Economy meant different things to different people, but generally included the following
elements:

This article shares the view of most of those producing the literature addressing these issues, viz.,
that information and communications technologies
(ICT) have irrevocably changed the US economy and
a small number of additional economies. In time it can
change others as well. The macro economy must of
course still deal with the decisions and actions of the
aggregate of micro agents, and we have all seen the
evidence that despite new, information age technologies, this cannot yet be done in a manner that eliminates the cycle.

esignation of the economic developments of recent years as the “New Economy” was probably
counterproductive. To some the New Economy was
simply the new technology sectors of the economy.
The crash of the NASDAQ and the closing of the neuer
Markt in Germany gave rise in some quarters to the
notion that the New Economy had become defunct.

• the belief that recessions had been overcome and
that stock prices, which had actually become bubble
prices, represented legitimate possibilities for future
wealth, i.e. the actual present value of ﬁrms;
• the productivity revival that occurred in the United
States mostly in the second half of the 1990s;
• the ascension of knowledge roughly to the level of
a factor of production, and the development of information and communications technologies to an
extent that makes all sectors of the economy more
productive;
• the institutional changes that were necessary for
the ﬁrm’s accommodation to the digital economy,
the organization of the ﬁrm, the nature of industrial
competition etc., which are transforming commerce,
the economy, and society.
The ﬁrst item proved an illusion with the arrival of
the 2001-2003 recession, which caused many to suppose that the New Economy was now defunct. Actually, it only proved that that particular misconception
is now defunct; it had been rejected by many before
the recession arrived.1 None of the other propositions
have really been changed by the recession. Those who
tend to believe that these phenomena are neither chimerical nor transitory, nor restricted to a small number
of select industries, are beginning to favor different
* Douglas and Efﬁe Driggs Professor of Economics, Brigham Young
University, Provo, Utah, USA.
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This paper will ﬁrst address the questions whether
there has been, whether there is, and whether there
will be what we have called a “New Economy.” It will
review the core issues and the views of those qualiﬁed
to tell us what a new economy might be. It will then
turn, hopefully for the last time, to the question of the
durability and viability of business cycles in the face
of the technological developments of the information
age. Next it will ask what went wrong with the New
Economy and consider its characteristics as well as
its remaining possibilities and prospects for the future.
Finally, it will consider the spread of the Information
Economy to Europe, especially to Germany, the country that one might expect to be the leading European
player, but which is not at present actually a strong
competitor for that role.
Impact on Productivity Growth
A rapid decline in the prices of computers and other
information and communications equipment in recent
years has permitted a dramatic diffusion of computer-based technologies. This resulted not in technical
change creating greater output from the same inputs,
1
P. J. B r y s o n : Economy and “New Economy” in the United States
and Germany, in: INTERECONOMICS, Vol. 36, No. 4, July/August
2001, pp. 180-190.
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but in massive substitution of computers in home use
and in the business sector for other types of equipment and for labor.2 Normally, capital equipment
results in “spillovers” which appear in econometric
studies as “residual” economic growth after that attributable to capital and labor is taken into account.
Over the period from 1948-1973, output grew at the
rate of 3.4% per year, of which capital and consumers’ durables produced 43%, while labor produced
32% of the total growth. Total factor productivity accounted for the remaining 25%. But output growth
slowed dramatically after 1973, and again less markedly after 1990, reducing the rate of output growth a
full percentage point – to 2.4% per year – from 1990 to
1996. It should be observed here that computers have
contributed to growth not only as an investment good,
but also through a “service ﬂow” to households. Since
1990, according to Jorgenson and Stiroh, computers
contributed nearly a sixth of the annual 2.4% output
growth: they represented approximately 20% of the
contribution of capital inputs to growth and 14% of the
contribution of consumers’ durables services.
There is no question that computer-related gains
are changing the economy in a fundamental way.
They are not doing so, however, by producing growth
spillover effects to the economy as a whole. Rather,
returns to the economy’s investments in IT equipment
have been captured by computer producers and users
themselves as they substitute this equipment for other
inputs.
It does appear that the “New Economy” could have
produced an increase in the productivity of the American economy. Since the middle of the seventies that
productivity had clearly slowed down, prohibiting a
growth of incomes. But it was expected that the introduction of new technologies, especially in information
processing and telecommunications, could reverse
this trend. Naturally, there is usually a lag between the
implementation of new technologies and the appearance of productivity effects. Heileman et.al.3 show that
the quarterly productivity rates since about 1995 do
in fact seem to indicate an upward shift in the trend.
The time period in question is a brief one, so that New
Economy skeptics have doubted whether the rather
dramatic increases will be sustained. There have been
periods of increasing productivity in the past, especially in the last phases of cyclical upturns, which did
2

D. W. J o r g e n s o n , K. J. S t i r o h : Information Technology and
Growth, in: American Economic Review, Vol. 89, No. 2, 1999,
pp. 109-115.

3

U. H e i l e m a n n , R. D ö h r n , H. D. von L o e f f e l h o l z , E. S c h ä f e rJ ä c k e l : Der Wirtschaftsaufschwung der Vereinigten Staaten in den
neunziger Jahren – Rolle und Beitrag makroökonomischer Faktoren,
Essen 2000, Rhine-Westphalia Institute for Economic Research (RIW),
p. 36.
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after a time prove to be strictly temporary. We need to
look carefully at that brief period and beyond it.
American ﬁrms invested at a remarkable pace in
information technologies, with investments in computers and peripheral equipment increasing more than
four-fold between 1995 and 1999. Output per labor
hour increased at approximately 2.5% annually between 1995 and 1999. In this period, the contribution
of IT capital to output growth increased dramatically,
nearly doubling to 1.1 percentage points. Information
technology capital assumed greater importance in the
economy and there was more rapid growth of the real
stocks of computer hardware and communications
equipment.4
Jorgenson5 has attributed the resurgence of American productivity growth to the spectacular development and deployment of semiconductors. Heavy
investments in IT products have reﬂected an amazing
decline in IT prices, which has in turn been a product
of the development of semiconductor technology. It is
encouraging that Jorgenson could report that semiconductor prices are projected to continue to decline
for another decade at least.
Jorgenson indicates that the most important source
of US economic growth throughout the postwar
period has been capital input. But since 1995 the
contribution of that factor has accelerated economic
growth by nearly a full percentage point, with the IT
contribution accounting for over half of that increase.
As Jorgenson retraces the development of the semiconductor phenomenon one reviews with him a set
of technological achievements producing structural
rather than cyclical changes in the economy. When
he ﬁnds it premature to extrapolate the productivity
growth of the relatively recent past for these industries into the indeﬁnite future, he declines to do so
because that growth is dependent on the persistence
of a two-year product cycle for semiconductors. This,
of course, is what underlies the growth of IT capital
services, which increased from 11.51% annually from
1990-1995 to 19.41 in the second half of the decade.
Growth of non-IT capital services increased from the
ﬁrst to the second half of the decade, increasing from
1.72% to 2.94%, reversing the trend toward slower
capital growth through 1995.
The ICT skeptic, respected and cited by his colleagues in the ﬁeld, is Robert Gordon. Baily,6 for example, like most of his colleagues, attributes a large
4

S. D. O l i n e r, D. E. S i c h e l : The Resurgence of Growth in the Late
1990s: Is Information Technology the Story?, in: Journal of Economic
Perspectives, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2000, pp. 3-22.

5

D. W. J o r g e n s o n : Information Technology and the U.S. Economy,
in: American Economic Review, Vol. 91, No. 1, 2001, pp. 1-32.

6

M. N. B a i l y : The New Economy: Post Mortem or Second Wind?, in:
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2002, pp. 3-22.
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boost in labor productivity to rapid accumulation of
information technology capital, as well as from faster
multifactor productivity within the information technology sector. But Baily feels the necessity of addressing
counterarguments raised by Gordon.
The latter argues that faster labor productivity
growth, appropriately adjusted for cyclical effects, is
the result merely of faster multifactor productivity
growth in the IT sector itself and in the rest of durable
manufacturing.7 But the IT sector and durable manufacturing together constitute only approximately 12%
of the private economy. Moreover, Gordon holds that
during the boom of 1995-2000 even many of the
New Economy optimists could perceive that output
growth was running at a faster pace than the sustainable long-term growth trend. Therefore, according to
Gordon the productivity growth was largely a cyclical
phenomenon. He still wonders to what extent the ITC
industries represent fundamental new technologies,
completely transforming industrial production processes and making fundamental changes in the organization of the ﬁrm and its labor relations.8
Oliner and Sichel9 emphasize that the crucial difference between Gordon’s work and their own is his
focus on trend productivity growth while their work addresses developments in actual productivity growth.
These authors also cite the work of Whelan10 and
Jorgenson and Stiroh11 as giving results similar to their
own.
Baily and Lawrence12 reject Gordon’s interpretation
of the productivity growth of the late 1990s. Like other
experts, they cite research results more compatible
with their own, in this case the work of Sharpe.13 They
argue that the substantial structural acceleration of
total factor productivity outside the IT sector proper
and the clear evidence of productivity acceleration in
those service industries heavily purchasing IT equipment certainly verify the existence of a new economy.
7

R. J. G o r d o n : Does the “New Economy” Measure up to the Great
Inventions of the Past?, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14,
No. 4, 2000, pp. 49-74.

8

Rhine-Westphalia Institute for Economic Research (RIW) and R. J.
G o r d o n : New Economy - An Assessment from a German Viewpoint,
Essen 2001.

9

S. D. O l i n e r, D. E. S i c h e l , op. cit.

10

K. W h e l a n : Computers, Obsolescence, and Productivity, Federal Reserve Board, Finance and Economics Discussion Series Paper,
February 2000.

These authors observe that labor productivity accelerated by 1.6 percentage points in the second half of the
nineties and that their estimates suggest the cycle had
nearly no impact on the period’s productivity growth,
implying a structural acceleration of productivity for
the period.
The productivity resurgence of the nineties reﬂects
both the production and the use of IT.14 Econometric
tests of a wide variety demonstrate a strong correlation between IT accumulation and labor productivity
development, and Stiroh ﬁnds that all of the aggregate
productivity acceleration can be traced to industries
producing or using IT intensively. He alludes to Gordon’s work and the assertion of the latter that, except
for cyclical effects, the recent productivity acceleration
is otherwise concentrated in the relatively small share
of the economy engaged in the production of IT and
other durable goods.
Baily’s work15 is rather destructive of Gordon’s casual observation that computers have been around for
almost 50 years and that the main productivity gains
they had to offer have already been experienced. This
betrays a lack of sensitivity for the sweeping changes
that computers have made and are yet capable of,
since it takes time to perceive their possibilities, implement the intangible organizational adjustments that
enhance their operation, and secure the full effects
of the information revolution, most of which go far
beyond numerical computation. These are the reasons
why Baily insisted that IT was not the sole reason for
the productivity revival of the later nineties.
He observes that a growth accounting framework
making use of both income and product data indicates
a signiﬁcant increase in multifactor productivity growth
after 1995 outside the IT hardware sector. Moreover,
when one reviews case studies of individual industries, one cannot ignore evidence that innovative business practices accompanying, although sometimes
unrelated to information technology, have contributed
in important ways to increased productivity.
Baily also relates productivity growth to the competitive intensity of particular industries, because
intensive competition increases static efﬁciency by
driving out slack management practices, promotes
the entrance of high productivity enterprises and the
exiting of low productivity enterprises from the market,
and encourages innovation on the part of companies
competing to survive.

11

D. W. J o r g e n s o n , K. J. S t i r o h : U.S. Economic Growth in the
New Millennium, in: Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No. 1,
2000, pp. 125-211.

But what of the future, now that the euphoria of the
late 1990s has ended and the recession has arrived?

12

M. N. B a i l y, R. Z. L a w r e n c e : Do We Have a New E-conomy?, in:
American Economic Review, Vol. 91, No. 2, 2001, pp. 308-312.

13

A. S h a r p e : The Productivity Renaissance in the U.S. Service Sector, in: International Productivity Monitor (Center for the Study of Living Standards, Ottawa, Canada), No. 1, Fall 2000, pp. 6–8.
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14
K. J. S t i r o h : Information Technology and the U.S. Productivity Revival: What Do the Industry Data Say?, Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, January 24, 2001.
15

M. N. B a i l y, op. cit.
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Will the post-1995 productivity revival continue? Baily’s “basic drivers” of productivity acceleration – rapid
improvements in information technology, strong competition and the impact of globalization – are still in
place for the productivity growth revival to continue,
and this is generally his expectation and that of other
specialists.
Although perceptions as to the drivers of productivity growth differ, Baily interprets the literature to
anticipate a near term productivity trend which will
likely run from 2 to 2.7% per year. That level of productivity growth would permit GDP expansion at a rate of
3.0 to 3.7% per annum. The important shift in the US
economy of the 1990s can be expected to continue
with productivity growth remaining strong. That, of
course, does not imply a return to the late-1990 economic euphoria.
Macroeconomic Stability
The euphoria postulate of the “new economic
boom” was that business cycles had been overcome.
The arrival of the recession should not make us dismiss this hope with a snicker rather than a retrospective consideration, since Zarnowitz16 presented for
evaluation some interesting arguments that were adduced to make the case that the environment of that
period contained elements that would discourage if
not stave off recessions. Zarnowitz himself saw some
of the arguments as dubious, although several of them
together might indeed contribute to greater macro
stability.
Alas, the arrival of the recession brought new lessons. These arguments included, inter alia, the notion
that downsizing and rationalization processes had
increased the economy’s stability, although effective
downsizing and cost-cutting would increase productive efﬁciency and permit later growth and “upsizing.”
Improved inventory control, particularly through
just-in-time management techniques was alleged to
have increased stability. But Zarnowitz observed that
constant dollar inventory investments in the 1990s had
remained about as “volatile and as cyclical” as in the
past.
The growth of the service economy was thought to
contribute to stability, since it was less volatile than the
manufacturing and construction industries which were
in decline. But it was no less apparent in the nineties
that the growing international competition in services
would likewise render them more cyclical. Meanwhile,
the deregulation of ﬁnancial and other industries probably added stability and greater competition in airlines,
trucking, banking, etc., likely enhanced productivity
16

V. Z a r n o w i t z : Theory and History Behind Business Cycles: Are
the 1990s the Onset of a Golden Age?, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1999, pp. 69-90.
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growth. But it is unlikely that further deregulation will
promote further stability.
Discretionary macro policies, shifting the emphasis
for control to interest-rate adjustments have been effective in the absence of less-suitable ﬁscal policies.
But policies cannot always anticipate and avert recessions or ﬁnancial crises, and policies can be misguided, mistimed, or bungled. And we have learned how
little help even astute policies can render in the face of
an investor conﬁdence crisis stemming from systematic presentation of misleading and falsiﬁed corporate
ﬁnancial information.
Globalization may well reduce instability as healthy
foreign markets reduce our dependence on domestic
consumers. Imported resources and products reduce
inﬂationary pressure in domestic markets. Globalized
capital markets are broader and more liquid, offering
the potential of reducing the risk of market bubbles
and crashes. But now, as a recession mentality distorts our view of the future’s possibilities, it may be just
as shortsighted to hold our gaze away from realistic
and promising possibilities of the information age.
The miscalculations, excesses, over-reactions, and
zealous retrenchments that are yet a persistent part
of human commerce may dim the promise of our possibilities from time to time, but we can continue to trust
that reason and rationality will ultimately restore us to
more favorable trends.
The most important thing that can be observed
about the business cycle here is that the current
recession will not end the productivity revival of the
late nineties. This is, at least, the consensus of the
productivity analysts referred to above. Baily,17 for example, defying the uncertainty that affects predictions
of productivity, expresses the conviction that strong
productivity growth will likely resume with economic
recovery.
Oliner and Sichel18 see the growth contribution
from IT investments remaining comparatively strong
“for at least the next few years.” Baily and Lawrence19
argue that an interpretation of the collapse of many
dot.coms as the disappearance of the new economy
“is a misreading of what has happened.” They ﬁnd
that the commercial application of the internet only recently became important and wasn’t the main source
of productivity revival in the 1990s. But the internet
will be even more important in the future, reducing the
costs of communications and transactions, especially
beneﬁting small companies. Litan and Rivlin20 estimate that the Internet will add between 0.25 and 0.5
17

M. N. B a i l y, op. cit., p. 3.

18

S. D. O l i n e r, D. E. S i c h e l , op. cit., p. 21.

19

M. N. B a i l y, R. Z. L a w r e n c e , op. cit., p. 311.
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percentage points per year to future growth. Finally,
at a conference at the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank,
Jorgenson and Stiroh argued that productivity growth
over the next decade will remain a robust 2.24% annually.21
These conclusions rest on technical analyses of the
impact of ICT on productivity growth. They are not a
forecast about cycles, although a prolonged recession could impact productivity growth by causing an
extended postponement of ICT along with other investments. Even if it does so, the end of the recession
would herald a renewal of productivity growth, since
the impacts of information and communication technologies on commerce, the economy, and society will
continue for years to come as indicated by the ﬁndings documented in this paper.
What Went Wrong?
To inquire what went wrong with the New Economy
is to ask the wrong question. It assumes again that the
New Economy included the provision that the cycle
had been consigned to the trash heap of history. The
arrival of recession merely indicates that that particular
conception of the New Economy was erroneous.
It wasn’t so much that the New Economy did anything wrong as that some of the early dot.coms did.
In a sense, that conception and the misguided thinking that accompanied it in some quarters were in fact
a problem for the New Economy. It was a problem
that participants based their actions not on carefully
crafted strategies, but on vague “ﬁrst mover” hopes
and the pursuit of market share through “introductory”
pricing. These mistakes sometimes proved disastrous
both for the foolhardy and sometimes even for those
of greater prudence caught in an irrational environment.22 Such low-price strategies, common to neophyte competitors in the fruitless price wars of some
unfortunate young industries, have had signiﬁcant
presence on the Internet landscape. The omnipresent hope of early dot.com experience was that price
discrimination would be facilitated by ecommerce
where sellers could retain and readily access detailed
information about the buying habits of their customers. But that prospect is undermined to the extent that
the customer uses the internet adroitly to ﬁnd the best
price available.
Porter23 has written persuasively about the folly
of using internet technology to shift the competitive
20
R. E. L i t a n , A. M. R i v l i n : Projecting the Economic Impact of
the Internet, in: American Economic Review, Vol. 91, No. 2, 2001,
pp. 313-317.
21

S. L i e s m a n : Outlook, in: Wall Street Journal, July 7, 2002.

22

S. B o r n s t e i n , G. S a l o n e r : Economics and Electronic Commerce, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2002,
pp. 3-12.
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approach away from product quality, desirable characteristics, and service toward price. We have a case
here of the new internet technology triggering rampant
experimentation, with many companies subsidizing
the purchase of their product hoping to secure a base
of customers. In the same way, such subsidies have
driven costs down for some ﬁrms purchasing on line,
since suppliers are not only interested in attracting
ﬁnal consumers, but have also provided intermediate
goods and services to dot.com buyers at heavily discounted prices.
Porter avers that the focus of the dot.coms was
on the internet’s potential to reach large numbers of
consumers and the rapidity with which its use was
increasing. Instead, the focus should have been on
what impact its use would have on industry structure.
Somehow, the internet was expected to unleash inexplicable forces that would ultimately generate industry
proﬁts. It would increase customer switching costs
and strong network effects would translate into strong
competitive advantages and down-the-road proﬁtability for ﬁrst movers. But the Internet hardly raised
switching costs with the next seller a mere click away.
Too many ecommerce pioneers did not focus on
proﬁts, but pursued instead maximal revenues and
market share at all costs through heavy advertising,
giveaways, discounting, promotions, and channel
incentives. Indirect revenues from advertising and
click-through fees distracted their focus and effort,
which should have been to deliver real value that earns
a proﬁtable price from customers as the ﬁrm adds
unique value to the product for their buyers.
Remaining Possibilities and Prospects
But electronic computation and communication
capacities can also be properly used, and the New
Economy is also worthy of attention for the right things
it did and remains capable of doing. Brynjolfsson and
Hitt24 remind us, for example, that computers add
value not only in the area of numerical calculation. It is
their symbol processing capacity, as opposed to their
number crunching capacity, that will cause computer
applications to produce complementary innovations far into the future. IT encourages complementary organizational investments in business processes,
enabling cost reductions and increased output quality.
Such quality includes new products, improvements in
difﬁcult-to-measure product characteristics such as
variety, convenience, timeliness and quality.
23
M. E. P o r t e r : Strategy and the Internet, in: Harvard Business Review, March 2001, pp. 63-78.
24
E. B r y n j o l f s s o n , L. M. H i t t : Beyond Computation: Information
Technology, Organizational Transformation and Business Performance, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2000,
pp. 23-48.
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These authors also discuss a problem of IT that
seems especially important to me. The difﬁculty of
measuring the full impact with econometric methods
results in my view in an understatement of the IT contribution to history. As well as Brynjolfsson and Hitt,
Litan and Rivlin25 show part of the reason for this by
discussing the aspects of IT contributions not easily captured by the traditional growth accounting
techniques. Intangible characteristics that improve
quality, change product characteristics and quality as embodied in new products, improved service
for the consumer, and the speed associated with all
facets of transaction and ownership are not captured
in the usual quantitative evaluations. In the same way,
traditional measurement focuses on the measurable
aspects of investment, e.g. the prices and quantities
of IT products, while neglecting even larger intangible investments in developing complementary new
products, services, and markets, internal business
processes and organizational adaptations, and in
developing requisite labor and management skills. A
study by Brynjolfsson and Yang26 of 800 ﬁrms showed
that the value of the intangible assets associated with
information technology investments may be 10 to 1.
Consequently, an investment of $167 billion in computer capital in 1996 US national accounts may have
been the more apparent share of a total investment by
industry of $1.67 trillion.
Litan and Rivlin27 also make an important point in
demonstrating how much the internet adds to the value enjoyed by producers and consumers. It reduces
transactions costs in the distribution of commodities
and consumers, it increases management efﬁciency,
especially in facilitating more effective communications and supply chain management, and increases
competition, especially by rendering prices more
transparent.

ITC Development in Europe
Europe got a later start in the development of ICT
than did the United States. Although fewer individuals and households became a part of the information
revolution, and ﬁrms and governments failed to see
helpful computer applications as quickly in Europe,
the changes started to develop there with only a
short lag. Naturally, development in some European
countries outpaced that experienced across national
boundaries. The northern countries were quick to pursue acquisition of the new technologies, but France,
Germany, Italy, and Spain followed at some distance;
there were more pressing concerns in the era of most
signiﬁcant ICT development, such as the construction
of monetary union and the reuniﬁcation of Germany.
Germany was at ﬁrst doubtful whether New Economy productivity growth was real; Robert Gordon
became the academic father of German skepticism
about the productivity boom, but ofﬁcials saw the important possibilities in ecommerce and egovernment.
German households ultimately pursued DSL hookups
in greater numbers than did other Europeans.
For Europe of the 1990s, spending on hardware and
software, on communications and other IT services
was not fully 6% of GDP. US expenditures amounted
to roughly 8% of GDP. ITC investments in the EU were
2% of GDP and in the US nearly 3.5%. The gaps in
both spending and investment between the EU and
the Unites States have actually risen over time.28
It is more descriptive to say that the IT gap is not an
EU, but a national phenomenon, affecting some but
not all European countries. IT development in Sweden,
the Netherlands, and the UK is quite similar to that of
the United States, and Ireland has enjoyed returns on
IT investment (with a high TFP contribution from IT
production), although the four large Union countries
mentioned previously lag behind northern Europe.

Their vision of an internet revolution foresees a
gradual transformation of the international market system, increasing competition, reducing proﬁt margins,
enhancing productive efﬁciency and generating greater consumer satisfaction. Litan and Rivlin note that
speciﬁc sectors of the economy, such as health care
and other services, will become much more productive through the internet. Extrapolating from a modest
sampling of ﬁrms in each sector they estimate roughly
that the internet enables a total cost saving from $100230 billion annually.

By 2001, IT spending had reached 0.8 trillion USD
by the US and 0.5 trillion by Europe, roughly 38% and
24% of the world IT market respectively.29 Europe’s
share of the world IT market is smaller than its share in
world GDP, but the US share of the world IT market exceeds its share in world GDP. Here again, Europe’s gap
is growing: while the EU share of world GDP declined
by ﬁve percentage points in seven years, its share of
global IT expenditures declined by nearly eight points.
Both ﬁgures increased for the United States, but even
more so in the case of IT spending shares.

25

In 1999, at the height of the US boom, IT expenditures for both Sweden and the UK represented a larger

R. E. L i t a n , A. M. R i v l i n , op. cit.

26
E. B r y n j o l f s s o n , S. Ya n g : The Intangible Beneﬁts and Costs
of Computer Investments: Evidence from Financial Markets, in: Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Systems,
Atlanta, GA, 1997, Revised 2000.
27

R. E. L i t a n , A. M. R i v l i n , op. cit., p. 314.
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28
F. D a v e r i : Information Technology and Growth in Europe, University of Parma, and IGIER, May 10, 2001.
29

Ibid., p. 8.
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portion of their GDP than those of the US did. The
Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland also spent more on
IT than the EU average, with Finland and Belgium not
far behind. This large national diversity is the target of
EU policies, designed to make Europe more competitive in the development of information and communications technologies.
On the one hand, the EU is concerned that the contribution of computers to economic growth, although
sizeable, has generally been relatively smaller than
that contribution in the US. On the other hand, Europe
is reassured that the contribution to growth of communications equipment was relatively higher than in
the US.
The European Union has addressed the lag in ITC
development by preparing an action plan30 with targets for 2005, at which time it expects to see modern
online public services, egovernment, elearning services, and ehealth services. At the heart of the information environment will be a dynamic ebusiness system,
all of which will be enabled by general availability of
competitively priced broadband access and a secure
information infrastructure.
The EU is quick to emphasize the accomplishments
of the year 2002, which saw internet penetration in
individual households double, the telecom framework
in place, internet access prices falling, nearly all companies and schools connected, the legal framework of
ecommerce basically in place, the world’s fastest “research backbone network” established, and the emergence of a smartcard infrastructure underway. Clearly,
public support undergirds ITC development. The comparative development of the EU and the US will be a
matter of supportive public institutions and ﬁnancial
support, and the encouragement of private initiative.
In the meantime, it is reported that, in part due to the
recession in the US and in part due to an increase of
European investments, Europe has recently matched
the US in the past year’s share of GDP devoted to IT
investments.
Conditions in Germany
Germany is reluctant to view its position as “limping
along behind” (Hinterherhinken), but attributes different ICT developmental patterns to different economic
developments and experience.31 In the nineties, the
US enjoyed stronger pre-conditions for the adoption
and diffusion of information and communications
technologies, due to the German preoccupation with
30
Commission of the European Communities: eEurope 2005: An information society for all. An Action Plan to be presented in view of the
Sevilla European Council, 21/22 June 2002. See http://europa.eu.int/
information_society/eeurope/news_library/documents/eeurope2005/
eeurope2005_en.pdf.
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reuniﬁcation. Moreover, the structural reforms undertaken by US industry in the eighties in preparation for
the boom of the nineties had to be instigated by Germany in the nineties.
Development of the more productive information
economy is seen as essential by Germany. Confronting an aging population and a declining rather than
growing population, the only path to economic growth
and rising incomes in the long run can be through a
permanent and unswerving application of technical
and organizational progress. A substantial contribution
will have to come from ICT and it is seen as the task of
federal and local governments to provide the essential
organizational and institutional framework. To establish such a framework, the German government intends to restructure schools and university education,
strengthening the interaction of research universities,
government research grants, and private industry. It
is recognized that there must be greater ﬂexibility in
markets through privatization of state-owned enterprises, the establishment of more ready access to
markets, the elimination of industrial regulations that
have outlived their usefulness, and the provision of
an appropriate physical and ﬁnancial infrastructure
for new start-ups and the internal growth of German
ﬁrms. Some commentators on this issue are relatively
pessimistic whether the enabling German spending
on ICT will actually produce the desired productivity
enhancement in the current economic environment.32
The competitive conditions and institutional ﬂexibility
is simply wanting in the Federal Republic at this point
in time.
Being a follower is not always disadvantageous of
course, and Germany will beneﬁt by having observed
some of the problems strewn along the way in New
Economy history. Germans are fully aware of the intense, sometimes foolishly intensive price competition
in the dot.com boom referred to above.33 Naturally, the
on-line information on commodity and service supplies available to consumers will increase competition
among suppliers, which in turn tends to promote falling prices and increased productivity. Price competition of this sort is not enthusiastically embraced by
German ﬁrms, or sometimes even consumers, but
they are part and parcel of the information economy.
Gradually, there will be some accommodation in German attitudes to Information Economy conditions,
but there will also be a differentiated approach to the
whole question of internet competition in that country.
32
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